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SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
TO EDUCATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
INADEQUACIES OF WISCONSIN’S EXPULSION LAWS
Maria M. Lewis, J.D., Ph.D. Candidate*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2011 the Wisconsin Supreme Court was asked in
Madison Metropolitan School District v. Circuit Court for Dane
County whether a district court has the authority to order a
school district to provide educational services to an expelled
student who has been adjudicated delinquent.1 In a narrow
holding, the court determined that the district court had
exceeded its authority by ordering “a school district to provide
alternative educational services to a juvenile who has been
expelled from school . . . but is still residing in the
community.”2 Following this decision, the State Bar of
Wisconsin published an article titled “School Districts Need
Not Provide Alternative Education to Expelled Students.”3 This
assertion overstates and consequently inadequately portrays
the court’s holding. In fact, the question regarding a student’s
legal right to alternative education was not directly before the
court in Madison Metropolitan School District.4
In order for the Wisconsin Supreme Court to sufficiently
determine a student’s right to post-expulsion services, it is
* Maria M. Lewis, J.D., Ph.D. Candidate in Educational Leadership and Policy
Analysis, University of Wisconsin-Madison. The author wishes to thank Dr. Julie Mead
for her support and helpful suggestions during the writing process.
1 Madison Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty, 800 N.W. 2d 442, 442
(Wis. 2011).
2 Id. at 459.
3 Joe Forward, School Districts Need Not Provide Alternative Education to
Expelled
Students,
St.
B.
Wis.
(2011),
http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/pages/general-article.aspx?articleid=4709.
(“The majority concluded that while school districts may be encouraged to provide
alternative education to expelled students, certain provisions of the Juvenile Justice
Code do not override the District’s explicit authority to expel students and refuse
further educational services.”).
4 Madison, 800 N.W. 2d 442.
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necessary to explore the origin of the right to an education in
the state of Wisconsin. A thorough examination would include
an analysis of the state constitution and its relationship to the
state’s expulsion laws—an analysis that was absent from the
court’s opinion in Madison Metropolitan School District.
Instead, the court focused its attention on the district court’s
authority to compel a school district to provide educational
services to a student who had been lawfully expelled, which
was an appropriate focus in light of the questions it was asked
to answer.5 Consequently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court left
the following separate but related questions unanswered:
1. Are Wisconsin statutes that allow for permanent
expulsion constitutional under the state constitution?
2. When, if at all, are students entitled to post-expulsion
services or alternative education in the state of Wisconsin?
3. If Wisconsin expulsion statutes are found to be
unconstitutional, in what ways can the state legislature modify
the state’s expulsion laws so that they are supported by the
state constitution?
This article seeks to answer each one of these questions
through a comprehensive examination of relevant federal and
state law. This article will begin with an in-depth discussion of
Madison Metropolitan School District, placing particular
emphasis on the court’s understanding of school districts’
authority to expel students. The second section of this article
will discuss relevant federal and state law, including the
federal and state constitutions, which will demonstrate that
Wisconsin’s expulsion laws fail to meet the high standard to
which they must be held. After establishing the inadequacy of
Wisconsin’s expulsion laws, the third section of this paper will
be devoted to providing examples of analogous case law in
other states to further illustrate the legal infirmities of
Wisconsin’s expulsion laws and to provide a basis for potential
revisions. The fourth section will discuss some ways that the
Wisconsin state legislature could amend the statutes to reflect
the legal importance of education in the state of Wisconsin. The
fifth and final section will provide guidance to administrators
who wish to expediently correct the problem at the local level.6
Madison, 800 N.W. 2d 442.
It is important to note that although significant research demonstrates the
value of educational interventions and strategies that seek to prevent or correct
behavioral problems that lead to expulsions, such strategies are outside the scope of
5
6
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The purpose of this article is to encourage a closer look at
the important role that the status of education as a
fundamental
right7
should
play
in
assessing
the
constitutionality of Wisconsin’s expulsion laws. It is important
to note that the goal is not to challenge Wisconsin school
districts’ authority to expel students. Rather, the objective is to
engage in the type of robust legal analysis that is necessary to
justify a violation of a fundamental right, such as education in
the state of Wisconsin. This analysis will expose the
deficiencies in Wisconsin’s expulsion laws and, in turn, the
need for revisions that strike a balance between a student’s
right to an education and school district authority to discipline
students for behavior that threatens school safety or
significantly interferes with the school district’s educational
mission.
II.

MADISON METROPOLITAN SCHOOL DISTRICT

In order to reach its final decision in Madison Metropolitan
School District, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on district
court opinions, statutory construction, and the authority of the
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI), the state’s
education agency, to determine that the circuit court exceeded
its authority when it attempted to force Madison Metropolitan
School District (MMSD) to provide educational services to a
student who had been legally expelled.8 The state constitution
is a foundational source of authority in the creation of a
student’s right to education, though the court failed to consider
it in its decision.9 Instead, the case focused on the Juvenile
Justice Code and its relationship to districts’ statutory
authority to expel students.10
Both the Juvenile Justice Code and its relationship to
statutory authority are undoubtedly important to analyzing the
facts before the court in Madison Metropolitan School District,
but they ultimately fall short of resolving the question over the
this article. Instead, this article assumes that decision makers have exhausted these
options.
7 Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W. 2d 388 (Wis. 2000);
8 Madison, 800 N.W. 2d.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 449.
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relationship between the state’s expulsion laws and the
fundamental right to an education. Nonetheless, the case has
been understood by some to mean that school districts are
under no legal obligation to provide educational services upon
expulsion.11 The following analysis will explain why such an
interpretation of Madison Metropolitan School District is
misguided insofar as it overstates the question before the court
and reaches an erroneous conclusion without engaging in the
kind of rigorous analysis that is necessary to resolve such an
important legal question.
A.

Facts and Procedural History

On June 5, 2009, M.T., a fifteen-year-old student at the
time, brought nine bags of marijuana to Madison East High
School.12 As a result, M.T. was arrested and charged with
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver.13 Finding that
the conduct was sufficient to meet the statutory requirements
for expulsion, an independent hearing officer issued an order
granting the school administration’s request for expulsion to
last three semesters.14 After one semester, M.T. was eligible for
reinstatement, provided that he met certain conditions.15 The
District Board of Education approved the order.16 A separate
proceeding began on July 9, 2009. The judge assigned to the
case ordered the Dane County Department of Health and
Human Services (DHS) to provide a predisposition report,
which according to Wisconsin statutes must include “[a] plan
for the provision of educational services to the juvenile,
prepared after consultation with the staff of the school in which
the juvenile is enrolled or the last school in which the juvenile
was enrolled.”17 Despite DHS’s recommendation that M.T.
attend school, the school district refused.18 The school district
even refused to provide materials for home schooling.19
Forward, supra note 3.
Madison, 800 N.W. 2d at 445.
13 Id.
14 Id. (Under Wis. Stat. §120.13(1)(e), as an alternative to general procedures, a
school board has the authority to appoint an independent hearing officer to make
determinations regarding expulsions.)
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. (citing Wis. Stat. § 938.33(1)(e).)
18 Id.
19 Id. at 446.
11
12
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After multiple unsuccessful attempts to reach an agreement
between the judge, DHS, and the Madison Metropolitan School
District (MMSD), the judge issued an order that required the
school district to provide M.T. with educational services.20
MMSD agreed to provide ten hours a week of direct instruction,
which was consistent with the judge’s order that the services be
“not less than those provided in the Dane County Juvenile
Detention Center.”21 After its motion for reconsideration was
denied, the school district appealed.22 On appeal, the court of
appeals vacated the circuit court order that required MMSD to
provide educational services.23
B.

Analysis

The primary legal question before the Wisconsin Supreme
Court was as follows: Did the district court act within its
authority when it ordered that MMSD to provide alternative
educational services to a student who had been expelled from
school?24 In order to answer this question, the court first
discussed the legal authority under which school districts can
discipline students.25 The court held that Wisconsin Statute
§120.13(1)(c)1 grants Wisconsin school districts express
authority to expel students from school.26 Although the term
“expel” is not defined in Wisconsin Statute §120.13,27 the court
relied on the state education agency’s longstanding
interpretation of school districts’ obligations, finding that “a
school district bears no responsibility for providing an
education to expelled students.”28 In other words, expulsion
means to expel students from all educational services.
Id. at 447.
Id.
22 Id. at 448.
23 Id. (Specifically, the court of appeals granted MMSD’s writ of prohibition,
which required MMSD to satisfy five criteria “(1) an appeal would be an utterly
inadequate remedy; (2) the duty of the circuit court is plain; (3) its refusal to act within
the line such duty or its intent to act in violation of such duty is clear; (4) the results of
the circuit court’s action would not only be prejudicial, but also incur extraordinary
hardship; and (5) the request for relief was made promptly and speedily.” Id. at 457.).
24 Id. at 444.
25 Id. at 449–51.
26 Id. at 449.
27 WIS. STAT. §120.13
28 Madison, 800 N.W. 2d at 450 (citing Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 149 F. Supp.
2d 665, 668 n.3 (E.D.Wis. 2001)).
20
21
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In fact, the court went so far as to accept as law the state
education agency’s conclusion that “a failure to provide such
alternative education is not a violation of an expelled student’s
constitutional
rights.”29
The
court
presumed
the
constitutionality of the state’s expulsion laws in order to reach
its final decision. Specifically, the court stated that “[i]n
general, expulsion from a Wisconsin public school district
removes a pupil’s right to receive a free public education from
any Wisconsin public school.”30 This blind acceptance without
proper corresponding legal analysis disregards a vital legal
question and improperly bestows upon the state education
agency the authority to determine the reach of the state
constitution—a responsibility that should be left to the courts.
The circuit court based its position on the authority granted
to it through the Juvenile Justice Code.31 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court found that although the circuit court had the
authority to order the student educational programming under
Wisconsin Statute 938.34(7d), such authority is not so far
reaching that it permits the court to order a school district to
provide the programming.32 In the end, the court held that the
circuit court exceeded its statutory authority when it ordered
MMSD to provide post-expulsion services.33
The narrative of Madison Metropolitan School District
demonstrates that it is not advisable to treat the case as
though it stands for the assertion that Wisconsin school
districts are unequivocally not required to provide postexpulsion services. Related but distinct from the narrow
question
before
the
Wisconsin
Supreme
Court,
a
comprehensive analysis of the state’s obligation with regard to
education requires an in-depth examination of the relationship
between the state’s expulsion statutes and the fundamental
right to education under the State Constitution. This rigorous
analysis exposes the inadequacies of Wisconsin’s expulsion
laws. As the following sections demonstrate, there are several

29 Id. at 451 (citing C.M. v. Kenosha Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., Superintendent of
Pub. Instruction Decision and Order No. 616 (Apr. 17, 2008)).
30 Id. at 451 (citing Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, Answers to
Frequently
Asked
School
Discipline
Questions,
http://dpi.wi.gov/sspw/pdf/schldscplnqa.pdf).
31 1995 WIS. ACT 77.
32 Id. at 453.
33 Id.

Lewis Macro.docx (Do Not Delete)

1]

3/4/14 11:26 PM

SCHOOL DISCIPLINE / RIGHT TO EDUCATION

47

ways the Wisconsin State Legislature can amend its expulsion
laws to correct the statutes’ current constitutional flaws.
Mandating the provision of post-expulsion services, at least in
most circumstances, is just one approach that the Wisconsin
state legislature can take to achieve compliance with the state
constitution. Before reaching the policy alternatives, however,
it is first necessary to lay out the legal foundation for the
insufficiency of Wisconsin’s expulsion laws as they exist today.
III. RELEVANT FEDERAL AND STATE LAW
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
the U.S. Supreme Court determined that children do not have
a right to an education under the U.S. Constitution.34
Nonetheless, in Goss v. Lopez, the court held that students are
entitled to due process under the 14th Amendment when
education has been deemed to be a statutory right as it was in
Ohio.35 In Goss, nine students were suspended for up to ten
days without a hearing.36 The Court held that “[h]aving chosen
to extend the right to an education to people of appellees’ class
generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on grounds of
misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine
whether the misconduct has occurred.”37
The Court determined that students facing suspension were
entitled to “some kind of notice” and “some kind of hearing.”38
Although the Court was dealing primarily with suspensions
shorter than ten days, the Court did state that more robust
procedures may be required in the case of long-term
suspensions or expulsions.39 As such, the severity of
disciplinary action, combined with the state-designated right to
education, served as the foundation for the Court’s analysis in
Goss.
Though the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that
education is not a fundamental right under the U.S.

34
35
36
37
38
39

411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Id. at 568.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 584.
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Constitution,40 the Wisconsin Supreme Court has deemed
education to be a fundamental right in the state of Wisconsin.41
Article X, section 3 of the Wisconsin State Constitution states
that “[t]he legislature shall provide by law for the
establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly
uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be free and
without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4
and 20 years.”42 The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s discussions
about and ultimate definition of students’ right to an education
have occurred in the context of school finance litigation where
the court has examined the state legislature’s obligations under
the state constitution.43 The most recent case was Vincent v.
Voight, decided in 2000.44 In Voight, the plaintiffs challenged
Wisconsin’s finance system under the state constitution’s
uniformity clause of the education article and the state’s equal
protection clause, arguing that the system failed to equalize
educational funding provided to districts throughout the
state.45 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the school
finance system violated neither of the constitutional
provisions.46 From the court’s perspective, the funding system
supplied adequate funding to provide a basic education to
students across the state.47 Funding disparities were attributed
to districts raising revenue above the amount guaranteed by
the state.48
On the issue of equal protection, the court analyzed the
appropriateness of applying the standard of strict scrutiny.49
The court reasoned that it is proper to “apply a strict scrutiny
review of a statute when the legislative classification interferes
with a fundamental right or is created on the basis of a suspect
criterion.”50 However, relying on San Antonio v. Rodriguez, the
Voight court drew an important distinction between “the
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W. 2d 388 (Wis. 2000); WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.
42 WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.
43 Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W. 2d 141 (Wis. 1976); Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469
(Wis. 1989).
44 Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W. 2d 388 (Wis. 2011).
45 Id.
46 Id at 396.
47 Id. at 408.
48 Id. at 413.
49 Id.
50 Id. (citing State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 468 (1992)).
40
41
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fundamental right to an equal opportunity for a sound basic
education under art. X, § 3 and the wealth-based arguments”
made by the plaintiffs.51 The court recalled its reasoning in
Kukor v. Grover, where it “concluded that a rational basis
standard should be applied ‘because the rights at issue in the
case before the court are premised upon spending disparities
and not upon a complete denial of educational opportunity
within the scope of art. X.’”52 Although the court decided to apply
the rational basis test in Voight, its analysis is particularly
important to the discussion of Wisconsin’s expulsion laws
because it implies that a more rigorous standard would be
appropriate in instances involving a complete deprivation of
educational opportunity—which is the case for expulsions.53
Furthermore, the court held that students have a
“fundamental right to an equal opportunity for a sound basic
education.”54 The court specifically described that right as
being one that “will equip students for their roles as citizens
and enable them to succeed economically and personally.”55 The
court stated
[t]he legislature has articulated a standard for equal
opportunity for a sound basic education in Wis. Stat. §§
118.30(lg)(a) and 121.02(L) (1997−98) as the opportunity for
students to be proficient in mathematics, science, reading and
writing, geography, and history, and for them to receive
instruction in the arts and music, vocational training, social
sciences, health, physical education and foreign language, in
accordance with their age and aptitude.56

Expulsion without educational services, especially in the case
of permanent expulsion, undoubtedly interferes with a

Id. at 414.
Id. (citing Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 498 (Wis. 1989)).
53 To apply a rational basis review in the context of school expulsion risks
rendering the characterization of education as a fundamental right to an equal
opportunity to a sound basic education meaningless. If a rigorous standard such as
strict scrutiny is improper in the context of school finance litigation, as the court found
in Voight and in situations where disciplinary action results in a complete deprivation
of educational services, it is difficult to imagine a realistic set of facts in which
education’s fundamental status in the state of Wisconsin would have more than a
purely theoretical value as it relates to asserting that right.
54 Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, at ¶ 87. (Wis. 2011).
55 Id.
56 Id.
51
52
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student’s ability to “succeed economically and personally”57 and
permits districts, and therefore the state, to abandon their
constitutional obligations to students throughout the state of
Wisconsin.
A.

Wisconsin Statutory Authority

Wisconsin statutes grant school districts express authority
to expel students.58 The duration of a students’ expulsion can
be permanent; no other school district is required to enroll an
expelled student while that student is under an expulsion
order.59 Behaviors that constitute expellable conduct are
extremely important to Wisconsin students’ access to
education. Unfortunately, the expulsion statutes fail to account
for the severe impact that such a decision can have on a
student’s future. According to the statute, students face the
possibility of expulsion if the school district finds the following:
[R]epeated refusal or neglect to obey the rules, or finds that a
pupil knowingly conveyed or caused to be conveyed any threat
or false information concerning an attempt or alleged attempt
being made or to be made to destroy any school property by
means of explosives, or finds that the pupil engaged in
conduct while at school or while under the supervision of a
school authority which endangered the property, health or
safety of others, or finds that a pupil while not at school or
while not under the supervision of a school authority engaged
in conduct which endangered the property, health or safety of
others at school or under the supervision of a school authority
or endangered the property, health or safety of any employee
or school board member of the school district in which the
pupil is enrolled, and is satisfied that the interest of the
school demands the pupil’s expulsion.60

Although some of the grounds for expulsion are fairly

Id.
WIS. STAT. § 120.13.
59 WIS. STAT. § 120.13(1)(f).
60 WIS. STAT § 120.13(1)(c)(1). (Furthermore, even if the conditions are not met
under this section, students 16 and older can be expelled if the student “repeatedly
engaged in conduct while at school or while under the supervision of a school authority
that disrupted the ability of school authorities to maintain order or an educational
atmosphere at school or at an activity supervised by a school authority and . . . is
satisfied that the interest of the school demands the pupil’s expulsion.” WIS. STAT. §
120.13(1)(c)2.)
57
58
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specific, “repeated refusal or neglect to obey the rules” 61 is an
all-encompassing stipulation that permits expulsion in
circumstances that may not meet the rigorous standard to
which a fundamental right such as education is held. “The
rules” implies any rules, thus permitting a school district to
permanently deprive a student of his or her right to an
education based on an arbitrary determination.62 While there
may be rare instances where a complete deprivation of a
student’s right to education is legally justified in light of
serious safety concerns,63 the inclusion of expulsions for benign
behaviors fails to meet the rigorous legal standard applied in
cases involving a fundamental right.
It is important to note that the authority to deny
enrollment to a student who has been expelled only applies to
students who have been expelled by a public school.64 A
reasonable explanation for the distinction between public and
private schools is as follows: the obligation to provide an
education rests upon the state. Therefore, only a public school
can take away the public right to an education. Nonetheless,
students who have been expelled from a private school are
entitled to public education, no matter how serious the offense
that motivated the exclusion may have been.65 In essence, two
students may face different consequences for committing the
same offense, one in a private setting and the other in a public
setting. One of the students may be deemed to be too
dangerous (public school student who is left without an
education) while the other must be provided an education
(private school student who is provided a public education).
This irrational outcome indeed weakens the argument that
previously expelled students present such a danger to the
school district that educational services simply cannot be
provided.
As stated above, in cases involving a fundamental right, a

Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, at ¶ 80. (Wis. 2011).
See id.
63 For example, Wisconsin Statutes require expulsion for “not less than one
year” for possession of a firearm. WIS. STAT. § 120.13(1)(c)(2)(m).
64 WIS. STAT §120.13(1)(f).
65 Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, Answers to Frequently Asked
School Discipline Questions, http://dpi.wi.gov/sspw/pdf/schldscplnqa.pdf.
61
62
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standard of strict scrutiny applies.66 Strict scrutiny requires
that the action be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state
interest.67 In the context of school discipline, the state certainly
has a compelling state interest in maintaining a safe
educational environment that is unhampered by serious
disruptions. Applying strict scrutiny, Wisconsin statutes, as
written, violate the state constitution insofar as they allow for
expulsion without services for offenses that cannot be justified
in light of the nature of the right to education in the state of
Wisconsin.
An example will help to illustrate the breadth of the law
and, in turn, the constitutional violation.68 In 2006, a student
was expelled for refusing to cover up a tattoo that was offensive
and violent in nature.69 Under the law as it is written, a school
district is free to expel this student permanently without
educational services. In regard to the school district’s interest
in maintaining a safe environment, a tattoo by itself is not
violent. Therefore, the law is overbroad in that it permits
expulsion for offenses that do not meet the government’s safety
interest. Even granting for the sake of argument that the
compelling state interest portion of the strict scrutiny analysis
is met for such an offense, permanent expulsion without
services for failure to cover up a tattoo fails to meet the narrow
tailoring portion of the analysis. There are other less restrictive
means for the state to achieve its intended goal of providing a
safe environment that allows students to learn. Alternative
educational programming and conditional reinstatement
provide some potential options. Although appeal to the state
superintendent is available to students facing expulsion,
substantive questions regarding the severity of the disciplinary

66

Voight, 614 N.W. 2d at 413; see also State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 468

(1992).
67

Monroe Cnty. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Kelli B., 678 N.W. 2d 831, ¶ 17 (Wis.

2004).
68 See also Gilbert J. Berthelsen, Wisconsin Expulsion Digest, Wisconsin
Association
of
School
Boards,
available
at
https://www.wasbmemberservices.org/websites/wsaa/File/wi_expulsion_digest_2010.pdf
(last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
69 H.H. by the West Allis School District, (571) April 21, 2006. See Gilbert J.
Berthelsen, Wisconsin Expulsion Digest, Wisconsin Association of School Boards,
available
at
https://www.wasbmemberservices.org/websites/wsaa/File/wi_expulsion_digest_2010.pdf
(last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
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measures is not within the state superintendent’s authority.70
Therefore, if procedural requirements are met and the actions
fall within the easily achievable statutory requirements, appeal
to the state superintendent is futile.
B.

Education in the State of Wisconsin

A broad examination of the status of the law as it relates to
the provision of educational services further emphasizes the
inadequacies inherent in Wisconsin’s expulsion laws. Taking
the state’s Juvenile Justice Code and federal special education
law into consideration, only a narrowly defined group of
students are excluded from educational services in the state of
Wisconsin. In tandem with Wisconsin educational statute
§120.12(18), Wisconsin Statute §938.34 ensures educational
programming for children who have been adjudicated
delinquent.71 This decision to provide children who have
committed serious offenses with an education reinforces the
state’s prioritization of education. Furthermore, federal special
education law guarantees that students with disabilities
receive educational services upon expulsion.72 Consequently,
both the Juvenile Justice Code and federal special education
law stress the importance of providing educational services
with limited interruptions, an outcome that stands in stark
contrast to students who fall outside these categories. This
categorization ultimately excludes them from state-provided
educational services for an indefinite period of time.
Taken as a whole, the state of Wisconsin abandons a

70 Roy H. by the Blair School Dist., (159) Sept. 26, 1988 (p.11); Douglas S. by the
Neenah School Dist., (162) May 23, 1989; Kristin J.P. by the Mukwonago Area School
Dist., (185) Feb. 21, 1992 (p. 12). See Gilbert J. Berthelsen, Wisconsin Expulsion
Digest,
Wisconsin
Association
of
School
Boards,
https://www.wasbmemberservices.org/websites/wsaa/File/wi_expulsion_digest_2010.pdf
(last visited Aug. 28, 2013). See also Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction,
Answers
to
Frequently
Asked
School
Discipline
Questions,
p.9,
http://dpi.wi.gov/sspw/pdf/schldscplnqa.pdf).
71 WIS. STAT. §938.34. Furthermore, juveniles who are tried and sentenced as
adults also have educational services available to them in adult prisons. See Wisconsin
Department of Corrections, Opportunities and Options Resource Guide, Jan. 7, 2011,
www.wi-doc.com/index_adult.htm.
72 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1)(A). See Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–446 (stating that students with disabilities
are entitled to a free appropriate public education even while under an expulsion
order).
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narrowly defined group of students without educational
services—students without disabilities who commit offenses
that are not quite serious enough to warrant involvement with
the juvenile justice system but sufficient to meet the
ambiguous standard for expulsion under the state’s expulsion
laws. A system that permits arbitrary exclusion from
educational services, made possible through Wisconsin’s
broadly written expulsion laws, undermines the state’s
longstanding commitment to education that gave rise to
education being deemed a fundamental right. It is difficult to
imagine how such an outcome meets even the less demanding
standard of rational basis review, which merely requires the
court to determine whether the law “rationally furthers a
purpose identified by the legislature.”73
C.

Relevant Expulsion Case Law in Wisconsin

Wisconsin state courts have not addressed the
constitutionality of the state’s expulsion laws. However, in an
unpublished opinion, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin held that “[d]enying a child an
opportunity for an education is the most onerous penalty
society can impose. Unlike incarceration which ends,
permanent expulsion shackles the student with the chains of
ignorance.”74 That case involved a student, R.T., who injured
another student with a knife, requiring 300 stitches.75 Initially
R.T. was suspended.76 The juvenile court found that she was
delinquent and ordered that she be sent to a juvenile detention
facility.77 She was later transferred to a residential home.78
While R.T. was in the residential home, the school district held
an expulsion hearing in which the hearing officer determined
that expulsion was the appropriate punishment.79 The court
opinion noted that the hearing officer did not make a finding as
to whether R.T. was a threat to other students or employees.80
Voight, 614 N.W. 2d at 413 (citing State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 468).
Tate v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., No. 96-C-0524, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22723 (U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. D. of Wis. Aug. 15, 1996).
75 Id. at 3.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 4.
80 Id.
73
74
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This was an important factor in the court’s analysis because
R.T.’s attorney argued that “she had been rehabilitated.”81
Because the school district ignored mitigating evidence,
particularly R.T.’s evidence of rehabilitation, the court
determined that R.T. sufficiently established a likelihood that
the school district violated R.T.’s procedural due process
rights.82 Specifically, the court stated, “[t]he State of Wisconsin
thinks the right to an education is so important that it has
enshrined it in the State Constitution. The District may not
ignore this right; and the United States Constitution requires
that the District provide due process before denying R.T. that
right.”83
Furthermore, the court directed the school district to
provide R.T. with substantive due process.84 Specifically, the
court ordered that the school district hold a reinstatement
hearing to determine whether or not R.T. continued to present
a threat to students and teachers in light of her good behavior
during her time in the juvenile justice system.85 The court went
so far as to argue in favor of finding alternative means to
provide educational services in the event that R.T. remained a
safety threat.86 Specifically, the court ordered that the school
district provide homebound instruction “or any other option
that provides her an education” under such circumstances.87
Permanent deprivation of educational services in this case, the
court determined, would be arbitrary and capricious.88
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion in Remer v. Burlington, where the court
rejected a substantive due process claim in a superficial
examination that took up no more than a half of a page of
analysis.89 Similar to Madison Metropolitan School District, the
court in Remer failed to address the relationship between the
fundamental right to an education and the state’s expulsion

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id. at 5.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 18−19.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Remer v. Burlington Area Sch. Dist., 286 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir. 2002).
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laws.90 Instead, in what appeared to be an insignificant
afterthought, the court summarily upheld the expulsion of a
student who was permanently expelled in an effort to maintain
a safe learning environment.91 As such, no court has directly
addressed the constitutionality of the state’s expulsion laws or
examined whether expulsion without services is permissible
when the offense relates to a benign refusal to follow the rules
rather than a drug or weapons offense.
Recognizing the draconian nature of Wisconsin’s expulsion
laws, Disability Rights Wisconsin filed a lawsuit against
Oregon School District in February 2012 challenging the
constitutionality of the statutory provision that allows school
districts to reject enrollment of a student who has been
lawfully expelled by another school district.92 While this case is
still early in the litigation process, it has the potential to work
its way to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, where the court will
be faced head on with a question that it was able to avoid in
Madison Metropolitan School District in 2011.
IV. RELEVANT CASE LAW FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Although Wisconsin case law on this topic is limited,
analogous case law from other states demonstrate the need for
change in Wisconsin. In particular, relevant case law from
additional states illustrates the significance of the state’s
education clause in the resolution of a student’s right to postexpulsion services. Specifically, these cases reinforce the
importance of the characterization of the right to an education
in the contest over students’ entitlement to educational
services upon expulsion. This section will discuss cases from
five other states to further expose the inadequacies of
Wisconsin’s expulsion laws and to provide insight into ways in

Id.
Id. at 1014.
92 Patricia L et al vs. Oregon Sch. Dist., 2012CV000452
(Dane Cnty Cir. Ct.
Dec.
17,
2012),
available
at
http://wcca.wicourts.gov/courtRecordEvents.xsl;jsessionid=0ECBD95A061E91D50E534
C24839ABBEF.render6?caseNo=2012CV000452&countyNo=13&cacheId=80E76408839
904630741E1042C3B15A9&recordCount=27&offset=3&linkOnlyToForm=false&sortDi
rection=DESC. The case was dismissed and the plaintiffs have appealed the lower
court’s
decision,
2013AP000293
(Dane
Cnty
App.
Ct.),
available
at
http://wscca.wicourts.gov/caseDetails.do?caseNo=2013AP000293&cacheId=CB562B5A1
885CE5AFF044EBC498828CC&recordCount=1&offset=0.
90
91
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which Wisconsin can repair its legal defects. As the following
analysis will show, the outcome of relevant case law depends
upon the legal standard that the court applies, the duration of
the expulsion in question, and what constitutes an expellable
offense under the law.
A.

The Right To An Education Extends To Alternative
Education Or Post-Expulsion Services

The case that most closely resembles Madison Metropolitan
School District is State ex rel. G.S, a case out of New Jersey.93
Although a lower court opinion, its analysis is particularly
instructive. The facts involved a student who participated in a
false bomb threat that led to his expulsion from his school
district.94 Through juvenile proceedings, the court ordered
probation conditions that included regular school attendance
and a high school diploma.95 The expulsion order itself was not
under review.96 Instead, the court was interested in whether a
student who has been legally expelled from his school is
nonetheless entitled to public education of some sort.97 Unlike
Madison Metropolitan School District, the court in G.S. relied
on the state constitutional right to education to inform its legal
analysis.98 Reaching the opposite result of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, the New Jersey court determined that
“expulsion of an adjudicated juvenile by his local school board
does not sound the death knell for his constitutional right to
receive alternative education in another setting.”99 The court
considered the fact that students who commit the most serious
offenses are provided an education in juvenile detention
centers.100 The legislature had even passed a law that required
the provision of alternative education for “juveniles who had
been adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation for
[incidents involving] possession or use of a firearm,” an action
which the court attributed to a recognition of the state’s
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

State ex rel. G.S., 330 N.J. Super. 383 (Ch. Div. 2000).
Id. at 386−87.
Id. at 386−87.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 388−89.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 393.
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obligation to provide an education.101
Similarly, juveniles in Wisconsin who commit serious
offenses receive an education in an alternative setting under
the Juvenile Justice Code.102 Consequently, the status of the
law in Wisconsin permits students who commit the most
serious and dangerous offenses to receive an education while
students who commit less serious offenses face the possibility
of exclusion from educational services entirely. This
discrepancy arguably fails to meet even a rational basis.
B.

Provide Post-Expulsion Services For All But The Most
Serious Offenses

By comparison, in Cathe A. v. Doddridge Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
the West Virginia Supreme Court carved out a narrow
exception to the constitutionally granted right to education.103
The case analyzed the Productive and Safe Schools Act of 1995,
which required removal from school for up to 12 months for
students who brought weapons to school.104 The court
determined
that
mandatory
expulsion
was
facially
constitutional in light of safety concerns and to create a
sufficient deterrent.105 The court found
in all but the most extreme cases the State will be able to
provide reasonable state-funded educational opportunities
and services to children who have been removed from the
classroom by the provisions of the Safe Schools Act in a safe
and reasonable fashion. Under such circumstances, providing
educational opportunities and services to such children is
constitutionally mandated.106

This decision to create a narrow exception marked a change in
the court’s prior stance, which, until Cathe A., implied that
students were entitled to services in all cases.107
To reach its decision, the court applied a strict scrutiny
standard.108 The court warned against a “constitutionally
infirm” conclusion that the state is under no obligation to
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

Id.
WIS. STAT. § 938.34(7d) (2012).
Cathe A. v. Doddridge Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340 (1997).
Id. at 344.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 351.
Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier Co. Bd. of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909 (1996).
Doddridge, S.E.2d at 346−47.
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provide any education to all students facing expulsion under
the Productive and Safe Schools Act.109 On the contrary, the
state remained convinced that there were likely factual
circumstances that may require the provision of educational
services even under the Productive and Safe Schools Act.110
Wisconsin’s
expulsion
statutes
would
not
pass
constitutional muster under the standard applied in Cathe A. If
the court in Cathe A. failed to find that the temporary
interruption of services for all students who bring a weapon to
school fulfills the standard of strict scrutiny, it is difficult to see
how permanent expulsion for even minor offenses can be
legally justified in Wisconsin, where, similar to West Virginia,
strict scrutiny is the appropriate legal standard.111
C.

Place Limitations On The Duration Of Expulsions

Some states have determined that the right to education
does not extend to students facing expulsion. Nonetheless,
these cases are beneficial to a thorough analysis of Wisconsin’s
expulsion laws because they illustrate the severity of
Wisconsin’s laws as compared to other states. Consequently,
the factual distinctions reinforce the need for Wisconsin to
change its laws both from a legal and policy perspective.
For example, in a recent case involving a student who was
given a semester long suspension for fighting, the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that even though students have a
statutory right to alternative education, this right is not
guaranteed under the state constitution.112 Finding that strict
scrutiny unnecessarily infringes on the decision-making
authority of administrators and rational basis review fails to
adequately protect students from arbitrary decisions, the court
applied intermediate scrutiny.113 Accordingly, in order to
satisfy the legal standard for a denial of services in North
Carolina, administrators “must articulate an important or
significant reason for denying students access to alternative
education.”114 The court reasoned that this standard allows
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 350.
Id.
Id.
King v. Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 704 S.E.2d 259 (2010).
Id. at 263−65.
Id. at 265.
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school districts to strike a balance between school safety and
the right to educational services.115
Similarly, the Wyoming Supreme Court found that students
were not entitled to educational services for the duration of
their yearlong expulsion.116 However, the short-term nature of
the expulsion was an important factor in the court’s analysis.
In fact, Wyoming statutes permitted a maximum expulsion of
one year;117 therefore, students were not denied all educational
opportunity. According to the court, “[t]he fundamental right to
an opportunity for an education does not guarantee that a
student could not temporarily forfeit educational services
through his own conduct.”118
Both of the cases described above involve fact situations
that address expulsion for a year or less. This factual
distinction is significant for the purpose of legal analysis. In
Wisconsin, the constitutional deprivation of educational
services is severe. There is no statutory limitation on the
length of expulsions.119 There is no requirement for conditional
reinstatement.120 School district discretion is virtually
unfettered.121 School districts are permitted to expel students
for repeated violations of any school rule if “the interest of the
school demands pupil’s expulsion”—a standard that is not
defined in the law.122
V.

POLICY ALTERNATIVES IN WISCONSIN

None of the cases from other jurisdictions mentioned above
analyzed the constitutionality of permanent expulsion, as is
permissible in Wisconsin. The severity of Wisconsin’s expulsion
statutes, combined with the nature of the right to education in
the state of Wisconsin, requires the state to modify its statutes.
Thus, in order to be consistent with its fundamental right to
education, the state of Wisconsin has at least three types of
revisions at its disposal:

115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id.
RM v. Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One, 102 P.3d 868 (Wyo. 2004).
Id. at 871.
Id. at 874.
WIS. STAT. §120.13.
Id.
Id.
WIS. STAT. §120.13(1)(c).
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(1) First, the Wisconsin State Legislature could limit the scope
of the law and what is deemed to be an expellable offense.
Through the use of more specific language, the legislature will
reserve expulsion only for cases that meet the standard of
strict scrutiny, thereby eradicating the constitutional
vulnerability of the overly broad language that the current
version of the law utilizes.
(2) Second, the Wisconsin State Legislature could place
limitations on expulsion orders. These modifications would
minimize the educational deprivation, thereby making the
argument for a constitutional violation much less compelling.
(3) Third, the Wisconsin State Legislature could require that
school districts provide educational services upon expulsion.
The arguments set forth in this article are centered on the
idea that students in Wisconsin are being denied their
fundamental right to an education. By providing services for
all students, the state legislature will address the problem at
its core.

Each one of the suggestions described above has benefits and
limitations. The following section will discuss each alternative
in greater detail. It is important to note, however, that the best
solution may be a combination of the options described below.
A.

The Use of More Specific Language

Wisconsin statutes permit permanent expulsion for
breaking any school rules,123 a result that cannot be justified
from either a legal or policy perspective. As a threshold
concern, and in addition to legal concerns regarding permanent
expulsion addressed earlier in this paper, expelling students to
the street can have serious societal costs.124 As such,
circumscribing behaviors that warrant expulsion is a critical
part of developing expulsion statutes that are prepared to
defend against legal and policy challenges. In general, loosely
WIS. STAT. §120.13(1)(c).
Alicia C. Insley, Comment, Suspending and Expelling Children from
Educational Opportunity: Time to Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U. L. REV.
1039 (2001); HARVARD UNIV., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT,
OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE
AND
SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE
1
(2000),
available
at
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/schooldiscipline/opportunities-suspended-the-devastating-consequences-of-zero-toleranceand-school-discipline-policies/.
123
124
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delineated authority has the potential to lead to extreme
inconsistencies in implementation, oftentimes in ways that
lead to disciplinary responses that are disproportionate to the
offenses committed.125 Furthermore, a significant amount of
research demonstrates that many students are facing expulsion
for non-safety related reasons.126 A recent study conducted in
Texas, a state that requires the provision of alternative
education to expelled students, found that out of a sample
including 928,940 students, 92.5% of disciplinary actions were
a result of discretionary decisions based on code of conduct
violations.127
Moreover, the flexibility that is written into Wisconsin’s law
as it stands today has the potential to lead to extreme
disparities in discipline patterns depending on a student’s race,
sex, socioeconomic status, or disability category. The Texas
study referenced above found that students of color were
proportionately disciplined, as compared to their Caucasian
classmates, for offenses that required mandatory removal (e.g.,
drug or weapons offenses), while students of color were
disproportionately disciplined for offenses that allowed for
discretionary responses.128 Undeniably, disparities in discipline
are not limited to Texas; in Wisconsin, students with
disabilities are disciplined more often than students without
disabilities,129 students of color are expelled more often than
their Caucasian classmates,130 and male students are expelled
125 Russell J. Skiba & M. Karega, Zero Tolerance, Suspension, and Expulsion:
Questions of Equity and Effectiveness, in HANDBOOK FOR CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT:
RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 1063−89 (Carolyn M. Evertson &
Carol S. Weinstein eds., 2006).
126 Id. at 1068−69.
127 TONY
FABELO, MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, MARTHA PLOTKIN, DOTTIE
CARMICHAEL, MINER P. MARCHBANKS III & ERIC A. BOOTH, BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES:
A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND
JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 36−37 (2011). Only 5% were related to infractions
that were defined in state statutes, although considerable discretion still rested in the
hands of school district administrators. Less than 3% were related to offenses that
warranted mandatory expulsion under state law.
128 Id. at 43.
129 Specifically, in 2010−2011, .22% of students with disabilities were expelled.
That was double the percentage of students without disabilities who were expelled.
Wisconsin’s Information Network for Successful Schools (WINSS), What percentage of
students
were
suspended
or
expelled?.
http://data.dpi.state.wi.us/Data/Expulsions.aspx?OrgLevel=st&GraphFile=E’PULSION
S&S4orALL=1&SRegion=1&SCounty=47&SAthleticConf=45&SCESA=05&Qquad=atte
ndance.aspx&Show=COMM&RevExp=4&Group=Disability (last visited Aug. 27, 2013).
130 In particular, in 2010−2011 the demographic breakdown for expulsions were
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more often than female students.131 These disparities can have
serious consequences and undoubtedly interfere with students’
equal opportunities for a sound basic education “that will allow
them to succeed economically and personally,”132 as required by
law.
Consequently, expulsion in the State of Wisconsin could be
reserved to objectively serious offenses. To demonstrate the
potential for constitutionally infirm outcomes, it is helpful to
return to the example from an earlier section in this article in
which a student was expelled from a school district because he
refused to cover up tattoos that the school board found to be
offensive.133 Whether the student in this case received
permanent expulsion for this offense is inconsequential.
Instead, the example demonstrates that school districts are
free to expel students for offenses that fail to meet the
constitutional standard. A denial of educational services for
such an offense could not possibly meet the standard of strict
scrutiny. Furthermore, the state has found that two acts of
defiance are sufficient to meet the “repeated refusal or neglect
to obey the rules” under Wisconsin’s expulsion statutes.134
These examples illustrate the types of expellable offenses that
have the potential to permanently alienate students from the
public school system.
as follows: American Indian or Alaska Native: 0.16%, Asian .05%, Black or African
American .60%, Hispanic/Latino .15%, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander .17%,
White .07, Two or More Races .10%. Wisconsin’s Information Network for Successful
Schools (WINSS), What percentage of students were suspended or expelled?,
http://data.dpi.state.wi.us/Data/Expulsions.aspx?OrgLevel=st&GraphFile=E’PULSION
S&S4orALL=1&SRegion=1&SCounty=47&SAthleticConf=45&SCESA=05&Qquad=atte
ndance.aspx&Show=COMM&RevExp=4&Group=Disability (last visited Aug. 27, 2013).
131 In 2010−2011, .19% of male students were expelled, while .07% of female
students were expelled. Wisconsin’s Information Network for Successful Schools
(WINSS), What percentage of students were suspended or expelled?,
http://data.dpi.state.wi.us/Data/Expulsions.aspx?OrgLevel=st&GraphFile=E’PULSION
S&S4orALL=1&SRegion=1&SCounty=47&SAthleticConf=45&SCESA=05&Qquad=atte
ndance.aspx&Show=COMM&RevExp=4&Group=Disability (last visited Aug. 27, 2013).
Further exacerbating the problem is the fact that the history of superintendent
expulsion decisions perpetuates these disparities by discouraging local decision makers
from considering the consistency in application. See, e.g., Nicole R. by Arcadia School
Dist, (580) Nov, 20, 2002; Benjamin Z., by the Marinette School Dist., (507) March 1,
2004. Specifically, the decisions support school districts’ decisions to ignore treatment
of other students since expulsion decisions should be conducted on a case-by-case basis.
132 Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2011).
133 H.H. by the West Allis School District, (571) April 21, 2006.
134 Russell T. by the School District of Tigerton, (99) June 17, 1982.
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In response, the state legislature has the option to reserve
expulsion for serious threats to school safety and serious
disruptions to the school day. In Connecticut, for example, all
students are entitled by law to an in-school suspension, as
opposed to an out-of-school suspension for violations of the
school code, except in those circumstances where the student
continues to be a threat to him or herself or others.135
Wisconsin could apply a similar approach to all disciplinary
actions. Although district-level discretion should be preserved
when appropriate, discretionary decision-making that
implicates constitutional guarantees should not be viewed
lightly. Taking into account the fact that education is a
fundamental right in the state of Wisconsin, expulsion for a
violation of any school rule is a constitutionally impermissible
use of district-level discretion.
It is important to note the potential downfalls of this
approach to statutory modification; for example, using
language that is too precise may interfere with school districts’
ability to meet their immediate safety concerns. Flexibility
allows school districts to address the wide range of concerns
that it faces every day. This paper began by stating that the
goal was not to challenge school districts’ authority to expel
students. However, the goal of more explicit language would
not be to infringe upon district authority but to restore the
constitutional guarantees that the state promised when it
deemed education to be a fundamental right.
B.

Limitations on Expulsion Orders

A second alternative is for the state legislature to place
restrictions on expulsion orders. In a few of the cases described
above, courts analyzed statutes that placed limitations on the
duration of expulsions. Similarly, one available option for
Wisconsin would be to place parameters on expulsions by
delineating the duration of expulsions. In 2005−2006, 1810
students were expelled in Wisconsin. Of those 1810 students,
1184 were expelled for less than a year, 462 were expelled for
more than a year and 164 were permanently expelled.136 If the
135 An Act Concerning In-School Suspensions, 2007 Conn. Acts 07-66, 126 (May
30, 2007). Although the law relates to suspensions, the decision to exclude students
from school only under circumstances that present a safety threat is can be applied to
expulsions as well.
136 Wisconsin’s Information Network for Successful Schools (WINSS), What
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legislature were to adopt an approach that limits expulsion to
one year, for example, students would be free to return to
school following their expulsion. A temporary interruption in
services would make it possible for students to receive their
constitutionally guaranteed right to an “equal opportunity to a
sound basic education.”137
Alternatively, the legislature has the option to require
reinstatement. This option could take a variety of different
forms. One approach would be to remove the statutory
provision that permits school districts to deny enrollment to
students who are under an expulsion order in any other school
district in the state.138 However, safety concerns would still
need to be accounted for under this approach. Therefore, it may
be advisable to combine this option with some of the options
described below.
A second approach would be to require school districts to
reinstate students, without placing time constraints on when
that reinstatement must take place. Considerable discretion
would be left to districts to assess their needs under this
option. On the other hand, too much discretion in regard to the
duration of an expulsion order increases the possibility for
constitutional violations. Requiring conditional reinstatement
plans may also be a consideration under this approach or as a
separate third approach.139 With regard to time constraints, the
legislature could adopt a fourth approach which would require
school districts to revisit students’ cases periodically to ensure
that the concerns present at the time of expulsion continue to
be relevant. Upon reviewing evidence, the state could require
school districts to readmit students.140 This approach would
happens
after
students
are
expelled?,
http://data.dpi.state.wi.us/Data/ExpLength.aspx?OrgLevel=st&GraphFile=GE’PSERVI
CES&S4orALL=1&SRegion=1&SCounty=47&SAthleticConf=45&SCESA=05&Qquad=
attendance.aspx&Show=COMM&RevExp=4&Group=AllStudentsFAY&CompareTo=C
URRENTONLY
137 Voight, 614 N.W.2d at 396−97.
138 WIS. STAT. § 120.13(1)(f) (2013).
139 Although Wisconsin statutes currently permit conditional reinstatement and
early reinstatement under WIS. STAT. § 120.13(1)(h) (2013), such actions are not
required.
140 The state legislature might consider adopting a special provision for students
who are transitioning from the juvenile justice system. Under such circumstances, a
state agency has deemed the student sufficiently rehabilitated, a determination that
should be accorded substantial weight in deciding whether a student continues to
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likely work best when accompanied by greater guidance as to
what the statute means when it states that the “interest of the
school demands the pupil’s expulsion.”141
One strength of these options is that they limit the
interruption in educational services, which minimizes concerns
over constitutional violations. On the other hand, the removal
of school district discretion that occurs when limiting the
duration of expulsions may prove to be dangerous if a student
is still not ready to return to a traditional learning
environment. This is particularly the case under circumstances
where the legislature mandates a particular maximum for
expulsion. However, reinstatement plans reestablish local
discretion by allowing school districts to address needs and
concerns specific to a given situation.
C.

Provision of Educational Services Post-Expulsion

The third alternative relates to the provision of educational
services upon expulsion. Similar to requirements imposed upon
the state in regard to students with disabilities, the Wisconsin
legislature could require school districts to provide educational
services to all students, even those individuals facing
expulsion. Under this alternative, the state has at least two
options: (1) to provide alternative educational programming in
school district facilities, or (2) to provide educational services
through other means.
In 2010−2011, 74.3% of students without disabilities who
were expelled were not offered post-expulsion services for the
duration of their expulsion.142 The percentage has seen a steady
incline since 2005−2006, when the percentage of students
without disabilities who were not offered post-expulsion
services was 43.2%.143 These statistics are in sharp contrast to
DPI policy, which encourages school districts to provide
alternative education to students facing discipline. The state
has the choice to reserve exceptions for students whose
presence poses a threat to safety under either one of these
options. However, in light of the fact that federal special
present a threat to school safety.
141 WIS. STAT § 120.13(1)(c)(1) (2013).
142 Wisconsin’s Information Network for Successful Schools (WINSS), What
happens
after
students
are
expelled?,
http://wisedash.dpi.wi.gov/Dashboard/portalHome.jsp.
143 Id.

Lewis Macro.docx (Do Not Delete)

1]

3/4/14 11:26 PM

SCHOOL DISCIPLINE / RIGHT TO EDUCATION

67

education law requires the provision of post-expulsion services
for students with disabilities, the argument that a general
education student’s behavior is so severe that safety concerns
necessitate a complete termination of services seems much less
compelling.
One potential downfall of this approach, depending on how
it is structured, is that the availability of alternative education
may encourage the use of disciplinary exclusion from the
traditional academic setting. This concern is particularly
important because it has the potential to lead to segregated
learning environments for students with disabilities, students
of color, and male students. As such, emphasis should be placed
on expulsion as a last resort and patterns should be monitored.
Nonetheless, providing educational services to all students is
the most reliable way to avoid a constitutional violation.
VI. ACTING IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTORY CHANGE
Although the focus of this article is state-level action,
concerned school leaders need not wait for the state legislature
to act. No legal barrier prohibits school districts from providing
greater protection than is provided under the current statutory
scheme. Each of the alternatives and their corresponding
options could be implemented at the district level. In fact, some
school districts have already exercised this authority in
creating alternative education programs and alternative
schools.144
VII. CONCLUSION
Education was deemed a fundamental right in the state of
Wisconsin due to its paramount importance. Unfortunately, the
state’s expulsion laws do not reflect such an esteemed status
and face a serious risk of being found unconstitutional. This
article began with three questions that remain unanswered in
the wake of Madison Metropolitan School District.
The first question asked if Wisconsin statutes are

144 WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, ALTERNATIVES TO EXPULSION: CASE
STUDIES
OF
WISCONSIN
SCHOOL
DISTRICTS
(2009),
available
at
http://sspw.dpi.wi.gov/files/sspw/pdf/expulsionalts.pdf.
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constitutional under the state constitution. This article has
demonstrated that Wisconsin statutes are unconstitutional in
that they allow for expulsion without services under
circumstances that fail to meet the rigorous legal standard. In
fact, contextual evidence demonstrates that the laws fail to
meet even a rational basis standard.
The second question asked when, if at all, students are
entitled to post-expulsion services or alternative education in
the state of Wisconsin. At the very least, students facing
expulsion are entitled to an education in cases when the
student does not present a serious safety threat or a serious
interference with a school district’s ability to educate students.
Arguably, educational services can even be provided under
these circumstances, although potentially through alternative
means.
The third question asked the ways that the state legislature
can modify the state’s expulsion laws so that they are
consistent with the state constitution. As this article has
argued, the Wisconsin state legislature can revise the statutes
through the use of more specific language, by placing
limitations on expulsion orders, and by providing a means for
students to receive an education upon expulsion (see Appendix
A). In the absence of such legislative action, the State of
Wisconsin will continue to undermine Voight’s constitutionally
guaranteed commitment to “a sound basic education . . . . that
will equip students for their roles as citizens and enable them
to succeed economically and personally.”145

145

Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 396 (Wis. 2011).
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APPENDIX A
Alternative 1
Scope of the
Law

Alternative 2
Limitations on
Expulsion Order

Option 1

Use more
specific
language that:
–Narrows the
definition of
expellable
offenses
–Defines
“interest of the
school demands
the pupil’s
expulsion”

Limit duration of
expulsions

Option 2

Remove
provision that
allows school
districts to
expel student
for any school
rule and replace
it with stronger
language

Require
reinstatement
–Remove
provision that
permits school
districts to deny
enrollment for
students under
expulsion order
–Require
conditional
reinstatement
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Alternative 3
Educational
Services Upon
Expulsion
Require postexpulsion
services:
–For all
students
–For all
students except
those whose
presence
threatens safety

Require
alternative
education:
–For all
students
–For all
students except
those whose
presence
threatens safety

*The appropriate solution may be a combination of these
alternatives or options

